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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEREMIAH MAUL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 990195-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MAUL'S CLAIM OF JUROR BIAS WAS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The State asserts that this Court should not reach Maul's claim of juror bias 
because it was not properly preserved below because "defendant neither objected to the 
trial court's conduct of jury voir dire nor availed himself of the opportunity to ask the 
venirepeople any additional questions concerning their knowledge of trial witnesses" (Br. 
of Appellee at 15). However, the State's argument fails to consider that Juror 
Christensen failed to disclose any relationship between herself and witnesses Clay 
Nielsen, Angela Goode and Mary Goode. If Christensen had disclosed these relationships 
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then Maul could have asked her additional questions concerning the nature of these 
relationships during jury voir dire. But because she did not disclose the relationships 
Maul had no such opportunity to question her because he simply did not know of the 
relationships at the time. Accordingly, when Maul learned of the relationships he filed a 
Motion for a New Trial which was heard and ruled on by the trial court. Therefore, Maul 
asserts that the issue of juror bias is properly before this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ARREST JUDGMENT AND GRANT MAUL A NEW TRIAL 
ON GROUNDS OF JUROR BIAS 
The State asserts that this Court should not reach Maul's claim because he failed 
to marshal the evidence (Br. of Appellee at 17-18). However, Maul asserts that he did 
marshal all the evidence in his Statement of the Case (Br. of Appellant at 3-5) and then 
argued the insufficiency of the trial court's findings—and the prejudice he suffered 
because of Juror Christensen's failure to disclose—in his principal argument (Br. of 
Appellant at 15-19). Accordingly, this Court should reach Maul's claim. 
To obtain a new trial based upon nondisclosure by a juror during voir dire, Maul 
must establish: One, that the juror "'failed to answer honestly a material question on voir 
dire,'" and two, that a '"correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause'" or at least allowed the exercise of a peremptory challenge against 
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her. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992) (quoting McDonough Power 
Equipment Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850 (1984). 
The State asserts that Maul has not established the first prong of the McDonough 
test and that this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because the evidence "clearly 
supports the trial court's finding that Juror Christensen's relationships with Mary Goode 
and Angela Goode were both "casual" and "minimal" and therefore, Christensen did not 
fail to answer honestly a material question on voir dire (Br. of Appellee at 18, 21-22). 
While Juror Christensen may have described her relationship with Mary and Angela 
Goode as "casual" , Maul asserts that these relationships were in fact sufficient to require 
disclosure by Christensen when she was asked to disclose during jury voir dire "any 
relationship or acquaintance [she] had with the witnesses that was something other than 
the casual acquaintance acquired by people living in small towns" (R. 197). 
Christensen testified that she worked with Mary Goode as a maid for two months 
in 1993 at the Super-8 Motel (R. 244 at 9,11). Christensen also testified that the two of 
them would use the same maid cart and talk about work (R. 244 at 11). On the other 
hand, Mary Goode's affidavit establishes that in 1996 or 1997, Christensen was 
employed, under her supervision, as a maid at the motel and that Christensen was fired 
because her work under Goode's supervision was unsatisfactory; and that Goode believes 
that Christensen's termination created feelings of animosity towards her which would 
have tainted her impartiality as a juror (R. 169-70). Mary Goode's affidavit is supported 
by the testimony of Angela Goode who also worked as a maid at the Super-8 for a period 
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of time and was supervised by her mother who works as the housekeeper at the motel 
whose responsibility is to check that the maids have correctly cleaned an made-up the 
rooms (R. 244 at 18). 
Maul asserts that even relying on Christensen's testimony alone, being employed 
at the same place and working side-by-side (often sharing the same maid cart) even for 
two months creates a relationship that is more than simply "the casual acquaintance 
acquired by people living in small towns." As such, Christensen's relationship with Mary 
Goode—particularly in light of Goode's testimony that Christensen was terminated for 
unsatisfactory job performance based on her evaluation and recommendation—should 
have been disclosed and the trial court's finding that it was merely "casual" is clearly 
erroneous. 
Christensen also testified that she has known Angela Goode for five years (R. 244 
at 13). Christensen testified that she had been to one social outing with Angela Goode (R. 
244 at 13). Christensen testified that Angela Goode had never been to her house nor was 
she aware of any rumors concerning an improper relationship between her husband and 
Goode (R. 244 at 13). Angela Goode, on the other hand, testified that in addition to the 
social occasion testified to by Christensen, she has been to Christensen's house on 3-4 
other social occasions where they talked and drank (R. 244 at 21). In addition, Goode 
testified that she was informed by the wife of Christensen's husband's best-friend of an 
accusation that she and Christensen's husband were having an affair (R. 244 at 24-26). 
While Christensen's relationship with Angela Goode is less substantial than her 
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relationship with Mary Goode, her feelings towards Mary would necessarily impact on 
her ability to impartially judge Angela's testimony. 
The State also asserts that even if Christensen failed to honestly disclose her 
relationships with Mary and Angela Goode, the very question posed by the trial court 
regarding any relationship between jurors and witnesses was not "material" under 
McDonough because it was only relevance was to provide Maul with information with 
which to exercise a peremptory challenge (Br. of Appellee at 22 n.8). However, Rule 
18(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly establishes that any relationship 
between a prospective juror and a witness which would "suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free from favortism" is subject to a challenge for cause. Clearly the trial court's question 
to the prospective jurors concerning any relationship beyond a mere casual acquaintance 
that they might have with the witnesses goes to the heart of the jurors' ability to hear the 
testimony of the witnesses and impartially decide the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, 
the trial court's question was clearly "material" and "germane to [Christensen's] capacity 
to sit as an impartial juror." State v. Pierce, 788 P.2d 352, 356 (N.M. 1990). 
Second, Maul asserts that had Christensen honestly disclosed her relationship with 
Mary and Angela Goode, that disclosure would have given him grounds to challenge her 
for cause and it certainly would have allowed him to exercise a peremptory challenge 
against her. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245. As cited above, any relationship between a 
prospective and juror which would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror 
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would be unable or unwilling to be impartial is grounds under Rule 18(e)(4) for a 
challenge for cause. Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise 
allows for challenges for cause where a "state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging." 
In this case, Maul's key alibi witnesses were Angela Goode, Mary Goode and 
Maul's mother. The jury was clearly informed that Mary Goode was Angela's mother. 
Maul asserts that Christensen's employment relationship with Mary Goode—namely that 
they worked side-by-side (according to Christensen) and Goode was responsible for 
Christensen's termination (according to Goode)~clearly would suggest to reasonable 
minds that Christensen would be unable to impartially judge Mary Goode's testimony. 
Likewise, because of the familial relationship between Mary and Angela Goode—coupled 
with the possible discord between Angela and Christensen over Christensen's husband—it 
would be similarly clear that Christensen would be unable to impartially listen to and 
judge the testimony of Angela Goode. 
Christensen may have testified that her relationships between Mary and Angela 
Goode were only "casual" and that there was no discord or disharmony between them. 
However, as Justice Zimmerman recognized in Thomas, "after the fact, the jurors may 
state that theistill could have judged the case impartially and the State may claim that any 
challenge for cause would have been^enied even if the questions had been answered 
accurately", however, "[hindsight should have no place" in this analysis. 830 P.2d at 
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250. Maul asserts that he established a prima facie case for a motion to disqualify 
Christensen for cause and that is sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the McDonough 
test. 
Moreover, Christensen's failure to disclose the relationship between herself and 
Maul's key alibi witnesses—and her potential bias against them because of an alleged 
relationship between her husband and Angela Goode and an sour employment 
relationship between herself and Mary Goode—prevented any investigation by the trial 
court and counsel into such an inference of bias and it prevented Maul from exercising a 
peremptory challenge to dismiss her from the panel. "Peremptory challenges are... an 
important part of choosing a jury." Thomas, 830 P.2d at 249 (concurring opinion of J. 
Stewart) (citations omitted). Had Christensen honestly responded to the trial court's 
question it would have "provided a fair and strong basis for removing" her from the 
panel. Id. at 250. Maul asserts that "the question in this case [was] of such a nature that 
the incorrect answer [by Christensen] providesa valid basis under the circumstances for 
requiring a new trial." Id. 
CONCLUSION ANI> PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Maul asks that this Court reverse his convictions on grounds that the trial court 
erred in failing to arrest judgment and grant him a new trial on grounds of juror bias. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J f d a y of December, 1999. 
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